Yu Inamura, President, Japan Counter Intelligence Association
In the United Kingdom, two men, including a British parliamentary investigator, were arrested in March of this year on suspicion of spying for China.
According to The Times, one of the two men is Chris Cash, 28, a British national in his 20s.
Chinese Spies Infiltrate British Center
The men were parliamentary research officers and directors of the China Research Group, a policy group set up by the security minister to study China issues and provide information and recommendations to ruling Conservative Party lawmakers involved in policy toward China. He was given a parliamentary pass but was not authorized to access classified information.
According to the China Research Group’s website, the group was established by a group of British Conservative Party lawmakers to promote debate and new thinking about how Britain should respond to the rise of China.
The man was hired as a researcher by Kearns, chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, and had relationships with classified political figures such as Tugenhart, cabinet minister for security affairs, who is a hardliner against China.
The man had previously taught for two years at an international school in Hangzhou, China.
It is believed that the man may have been recruited as an agent by the Chinese side during his stay in China, not through contacts on LinkedIn or other business-related social networking sites, but through contacts with people he met while in China or other countries or during his activities in Congress.
In this case, the fact that the Chinese spy (agent) was a parliamentary research staffer but was in close proximity to key government officials posed a serious risk of providing incorrect information to lawmakers, advising policies favorable to China, and leaking confidential information to China, such as the UK’s policy toward China.
In the UK, MI5 issued an unusual “Chinese interference” warning to MPs in the past, claiming that Chinese lawyer Christine Lee was attempting to unduly influence British MPs on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party MI5 alleged that Ms. Lee was engaged in political interference activities, including donating funds to support the activities of MPs. political interference activities, it claimed.
Chinese espionage attempts to meddle in politics have been prominently identified in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada, and Taiwan.
Chinese espionage has long been recognized as a threat in the U.K. In July, the House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee condemned the U.K. government’s response to the Chinese security threat as “a serious failure” and called for improvements.
Could a Similar Event Occur in Japan?
In fact, there have not been many incidents of Chinese spies entering Japan’s political center.
In fact, there have not been many cases of Chinese spies entering Japan’s political center, or perhaps “unrecognized and unproven” would be a more appropriate expression.
As a well-known case, in 2012, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Japan (45 years old at the time), who was from the Second Department of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, an intelligence agency of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, was asked to appear before the Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of opening bank accounts under false identities, conducting commercial activities prohibited under the Vienna Convention, and misrepresentation in original notarial deeds. He was requested to appear before the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of opening a bank account with a false identity, engaging in commercial activities prohibited by the Vienna Convention, and misrepresenting the original notarized deeds.
In this case, the First Secretary in question had been a student at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, and was also suspected of being deeply involved in a project to export Japanese agricultural products to China that was being promoted by then Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Kano, then Vice Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Tsutsui, and others. According to media reports at the time, the former secretary was in frequent contact with Kano and others, and had been in and out of the vice minister’s office as well as in contact with Defense Ministry officials.
Espionage by a Citizen Difficult to Prosecute
The UK case is not about espionage by Chinese nationals, but by British nationals. In the case of a citizen (agent) who is involved in Chinese espionage, it is not a case of detecting the Chinese agent itself, but rather the contact between the agent and the Chinese agent, which is extremely difficult even for investigative agencies to detect.
The reality is that there are many “suspected” cases (not cases because they have not been established) that have not been made public in Japan. In fact, according to a Defense Ministry official, he has confirmed that Chinese influence operations are still being conducted in areas close to politics, and I share this perception.
There are “suspected agents” working around politicians.
The CSIS, a US think tank, and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute point out that China is focusing on maneuvering to influence politics by contacting government officials through intermediaries and providing funds.
There is no reason why a similar situation should not be anticipated in Japan.
Awareness” is Needed in Japan
In this case, the men have not been charged and have already been released on bail, which illustrates the difficulty of investigating espionage.
As the Times points out, in espionage investigations, it is not only extremely difficult to collect evidence, but there is also the practical problem of how to convert the information collected in a covert investigation into evidence.
The UK has applied the Official Secrets Act in this case, and Japan has the Specified Secrets Protection Act, which is similar to the Official Secrets Act. Although both laws differ in terms of the definition of acts and penalties, they both provide penalties for the leakage or acquisition of confidential information, so it is not simply a matter of Japan not having an anti-spying law.
Inadequate Anti-Spying Laws Do Not Prevent Spying Investigations
Naturally, Japan must have a security clearance system and laws against spying with heavy penalties, but no matter how much legislation is put in place, if the “awareness” of those who have access to confidential information does not change, it will only be a game of cat-and-mouse.
The incident in the U.K. is not just a matter of concern for Japan.
Written by Yu Inamura, President of the Japan Counter Intelligence Association
